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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF 'THE STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD H. HOLDER,
Respondent and Plaintiff)

-vs.-

Case
No. 8984

RUTH M. HOLDER,
Appellant and Defendant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant will not take specific exception to plaintiff's summary of the facts in his brief other than to note
that the conclusion he urges drawn from those stated
are entirely speculative as to the crucial issue a::-; to
whether defendant was pregnant prior to being with
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plaintiff again and having intercourse on December 24,
1956. He relies heavily on the dependability of such
speculation by referring to a remark of Dr. Holbrook in a
deposition concerning the degree of possibility requested
(R. 57). l-Iowever, it is evident frmn reading this in context that Dr. Holbrook did not mean to be understood
as giving any reliable estimate as to the statistical possibility of this child being conceived on the date in question
and certainly not one chance in 10,000, as plaintiff now
argues. (R. 59, 60)

STATEMENT OF POIKTS
POINT I
THE CHILD IN QUESTION WAS A "NEAR TERM"
BABY, NOT A "FULL TERM" BABY.
POINT II
THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE IS THAT
DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE THE ADMISSIONS REFERRED TO IN POINT II OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE IS NOT CONCLUSIVE THAT DEFENDANT MUST HAVE BEEN PREGNANT ON DECEMBER
24, 1956.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
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ARG UJ\1:ENT
POINT I
THE CHILD IN QUESTION WAS A "NEAR TERM"
BABY, NOT A "FULL TERM" BABY.

Plaintiff in his brief impliedly conceeds that the evidence does not support Finding of Fact No. 8 as he makes
the tern1 in the alternative and thus at variance with the
finding of the trial court on this point.
POINT II
'THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE IS THAT
DEFENDANT DID NOT MAKE THE ADMISSIONS REFERRED TO IN POINT II OF PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF.

Since this case is one in equity, this Honorable Court
not bound to accept plaintiff's parents' testimony as
true because of the lower court's Findings of Fact No. 9
and No. 10. Again it should be remembered that the only
important admission of the two was not even mentioned
in the Memorandum Decision which was prepared by the
trial judge (R. 106). Defendant's testimony, which is
based on direct evidence and not admissible hearsay, was
a complete denial of such admission, and she is supported
entirely in this by the only other person having actual
knowledge thereof, namely Dr. Trowbridge, a party di::;interested in the results of this lawsuit (R. 117).
IS

It is significant that plaintiff's brief makes no rebuttal at all to defendant's contention that such admission
would be so contrary with the normal pattern of conduct
.v9
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that testimony as to its occurrence is not worthy of belief,
at least where reliable evidence is to the contrary. Plaintiff fails to point out wherein or why such admission is
compatible with any conduct that could be expected of
one In such a situation as he contends defendant was in.
rrhe conduct of defendant referred to by plaintiff is entirely prior to and unrelated to the important admission
in question. He states that the record is "filled with eviuence" that the defendant began to claim she was pregnant on December 25, 1956, and infers that this is based
on admissions of defendant in her testimony, but he fails
to state wherein the record such is to be found and appellant submits that the same is found only in the self~erving testimony of plaintiff or his parents.
Appellant objects to the inference that Dr. Trowbridge's affidavit was doctored up after he signed it. This
is not so. The alteration was requested by the doctor
and appellant's counsel considers the affidavit as originally pre~ented just as effective and can not see how such
alteration increases its potency any.
It is ('<•rtainly a JWil L-..'C(juitor that plaintiff's mother
<'oulrl not have known about defendant's visit to Dr.
Trowbridge absence any adlnission about consulting him
n>~rarrlino·
}lre2'naneY. In Yie"· of defendanfs illness on
n
the trip to Ca1ifornia, it would be quite natural to state
that siH' had eonsulted with Dr. Trowbridge regarding
lwr fln. J)pfnndnnt denied having the conversation reIn ted h~· pin inti ff'~ nwther. not that she ever had a con~~

L-'

•

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

I

versation regarding consulting with Dr. Trowbridge before her trip about a flu illness.
While it would have been possible for defendant to
have called Dr. Trowbridge as a rebuttal witness, that
would hardly seem to be necessary in view of the well
settled presumption of the law that evidence which is
available to a party who would normally be expected to
produce such evidence if favorable would be adverse if
produced upon the failure of such party to produce that
evidence. Plaintiff has the burden of proving pregnancy
prior to his first applicable intercourse and Dr. Trowbridge's testimony would have been vital, if not conclusive, in proving that if defendant had made the admission testified to by plaintiff's mother. Appellant ought
not to be required to prove the negative after demanding
that plaintiff produce such evidence if it proved the fact
·:e contended for. In any event, where the presumption
is proved to be correct, as here, such evidence ought to
be considered in determining whether the opposite was
true or not.
POINT III
THE EVIDENCE I.S NOT CONCLUSIVE THAT DEFENDANT MUST HAVE BEEN PREGNANT ON DECEMBER
24, 1956.

Plaintiff contends that the following iterns of evidence which are italicized conclusively prove plaintiff's
case. Appellant contends that they do not. ApparPntly
5
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this appeal rnust stand or fall on this point. If any of
these eight items proved this conclusively, as plaintiff
rnust do to sustain his decree in the lower court according
to the authorities cited hereinafter, the other seven would
not be needed. If none do so· per se, then the collection
cannot do so because it could only strengthen the statistical probability that the speculation urged by plaintiff is
a correct one.
1.

Dr. 11 olbrook' s estimate that baby would be born in
middle of August.

This certainly is not conclusive. This can only be
accepted for what it is - an estimate. Even Dr. Holbrook does not appear to have been very sure that the
baby was going to be born when she was in view of the
fact that doctors normally see patients weekly during
the last month of pregnancy and this baby was born between appoinhnents three weeks apart (R. 63, 64).
·>

According to plaintiffs father, defendant expressed
an intent to become pregnant before be-ing w·ith pla.intiff.

Not only is this inconclusive but, if true, would tend
to prove plaintiff is the father. Since this was covered
in s01ne detail on pages 4 and 5 of appellant's brief, it will
not be repeated here except to note !hat respondent failed
to malw

an~·

rebuttal at all to appellant's argmnent that

:-;twh <'OIHhl<'t \ra~ improbable and incredible.

6
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3.

According to plaintiff's mother, defendant admitted
contacting a doctor relati·ve to missing a menstntal
period.

If true, this could be considered conclusive, but Dr.
Trowbridge's affidavit (R. 117) proves it is not true. It
is well to bear in mind the fact that plaintiff had resolverl
to terminate the marriage immediately following the
baby's birth (R. 81) and this was known to plaintiff's
parents (R. 81). Thus the alleged conversation took place
at a time plaintiff and his parents were preparing for
trial. Plaintiff's argument that plaintiff's mother could
not have known about defendant contacting (this was a
call not a visit as respondent calls its-see R. 25) Dr.
Trowbridge if no conversation betwen them about it had
taken place is sound as far as it goes but it certainly does
not go to the point of proving or even raising an inference
that this contact related to possible pregnancy. In fact,
investigation by plaintiff's parents before trial determined that this was not the purpose for which defendant
contacted Dr. Trowbridge and this is why plaintiff did not
call this doctor as a witness (R. 117).
There is a well established presumption in law that
a party will produce evidence which is favorable to hin1
if such evidence exists and is available. Jones on Evidence, Ct'vil Cases (4th Ed.) P 49, says :
"The mere withholding or failing to produce
material evidence which is available and would, in
the circumstances of the case, be expected to be

7
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produced, gives rise to a natural inference - less
forceful than that arising from the destruction,
fabrication, or suppression of evidence in which
other parties have a legal interest but" constantly
acted upon by the courts- that such evidence is
held back because it would be unfavorable or adverse to the party withholding it." (citing 15 cases
to this effect.)
The instant case proves the wisdom of such a presumption. Appellant ought not to be precluded from establishing the real facts through Dr. Trowbridge because
of reliance on that presumption, particularly after mak- ·
ing demand upon respondent for the production of such
evidence if favorable when the ·witness to the contrary
would have a natural prejudice.
4.

According to plaintiff, defendant claimed she was
pregnant on December 25th.

How conclusive \vould that bel Again plaintiff seek8
to prove a case against defendant by attributing statelnents to her which defendant denies. Even if it were
so, it would be only a prognastication which subsequent
develop1nents proved to be correct.
•>.

Defendant fa~led to tell plaZ:.ntiff of Dr. Holbrook's
prediction as to 1chell the baby tcould be born.
\Vhat

i~

unnatural about that1 Does it tend to prove
d<>l'<>n<lant guilt~· of ilnproper conduct that she did not
rai~e ~u~pieion~ in her husband's n1ind based on refusal

8
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of some people to accept the exceptions to the average
period of gestation~

G.

Defendant took a pregnancy test on January 7th,
two weeks following her intercourse with plaintiff.

Was that unnatural since it was then 43 days since
her last period, much longer than even her irregular periods, and she had good cause to suspect she Inight be
pregnant due to relations with plaintiff~

7.

Freem(})n test normally does not determine pregnancy
within the period in question.

This is not conclusive. The evidence did not establish how unusual this was but even if this is rare, it hardly does more than show this was an exceptional case. An
exceptional baby, however, is entitled to the same protection of legitimacy as one within the statistically 1nore
common range.

8.

Defendant admitted being sick or nattseated on the
way to Californva.

Does that prove morning sickness~ If it did, there
would be more babies than there are and some born to the
wrong sex. It is uncontradicted that there was flu in
defendant's family at the time, that she had called Dr.
Trowbridge about treatment for flu and that she had
missed school a few days before the trip because of it.
Some people becon1e car sick without other illnes8. rl\>
9
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conclude this was nwrning sickness is speculation of the
rankest sort.
None of the authorities cited by respondent in his
brief provide a precedent for finding a child born under
the circumstances of this case to be illegitimate. Appellant
does not take issue with the extract from Estate of JJfcN a mara, 181 Cal. 82, 183 (P) 552, 7 ALR 313, to the effect that the presumption can not be conclusive in extreme and exceptional cases (cited in respondent's brief
on page 12). Reference to the facts in that case set
forth in Gonzales v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 202 P.
(2d) 135, at page 138 shmYs that in there the n1other
of the child left her husband on December 23, 1913, and
immediately went to live with one McXamara. She lived
with hiin until his death in :Jlay 1916: The child was born
October 24, 1914, 304. days· after the "ife had left her
husband. The evidence there was that prolonged pregnancies up to 300 days are possible but unusual. There,
unlike here, it \Yas undisputed that another possible
father wa~ involved. It is also well to ren1ember that the
interesbs of the ehild in question there were served by
incling hiin an issue of the decedent. The problem in
tll<> Gonzales l'. Pacific Greyhound Lines (supra). from
"·h ieh that extraet was taken was to detennine whether
!

or not :234 days was such an unusually short pregnancy
period

a~

to take it out of the

eategor~~

of a conclusiYe

pr<>:-llllllption and make it rebut~le. The court there
round it

wa:-~

not so unusual and applied the conclusiYe
10
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presumption. There is no intimation in that case that
the two shorter days here would have altered the holding,
particularly since the court there cited with approval the
case of Dazey v. D.azey, 50 Cal. (2d) 15, 122 P. 2nd 308,
which applied the conclusive presumption in a pregnancy
of 225 days and in which case the Supreme Court of California denied a hearing without a dissenting vote.
In the case of JI!Jrurr v. Murr, 197 P 2nd 369, a decision
of the 2nd District Court of Appeals of the State of California, cited by respondent, it was held that the presumption of legitimacy of a child born 190 days after earliest
possible fruitful coitus with husband was rebuttable
and reversed the judgment of the trial court who held
the presumption to be conclusive and granted the husband
a new trial. Even there the court did not conclude as a
matter of law that the child could not have been the lawful issue of the husband despite the fact that the decision
refers to testimony of unrelated witnesses to the effect
that the mother was seen in the company of another man,
was seen kissing him and was indecently exposed. Under
those facts, appellant takes no issue with the quotation
from it cited by respondent.
It is true that the parties were not husband and wife

at the time the first intercourse took place, but the overwhelming weight of authority in the United States applies
the presumption in case of premarital intercourse as well,
although some jurisdictions require less evidence to over-

11
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come the presumption in such cases than otherwise (57
ALR 2nd 729).
Cases are collected in 57 ALR ( 2d) 729 under section
(f) on Page 742 which deal with what proof is necessary
to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. There the case
of Needham v. Needham, 299 SW 832 C~Iissouri) is
<1uoted as follows:
"The rnodern doctrine undoubtedly is that
the presumption -of legitimacy arising from in
wedlock may be overthrown by any competent and
relative evidence disclosing that the husband could
not have been the father of the child."
This has been established by sho1Vwg that the husband
was entirely absent so as to have had no intercourse with
the 1nother. In Eldridge r. Eldridge (1944) 153 Fla. 873,
16 So. 2nd 163, it was held that evidence that the child
there was born 226 days after the first meeting of the
husband and wife, and it appearing from two days after
their first meeting and until their 1narriage some three
weeks later the husband engaged in frequent acts of
intercourse with the 1nother, and the 1nedical testin10ny
disclosed that the nonnal period of gestation is :2SO days
and that after the 190 days a child has a fair chance to
I ive \nt~ held insufficient to oYere01ne the presu1nption.
1Our case except 6 days longer period in this one.) :Jiany
<·a:-;p~ have declared that the part~~ assailing the child's
lq.?;itimacy lla~ the burden of proving beyond all reasonable doubt tlwt tJw husband wa8 not the father of the
12
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child. Gross v. Gross (1953 Ky.) 260 S.W. 2nd 655, Phillips v. Allen (1861) 84 :Mass. (2 Allen) 453, Second;ine
v. Secondine, (1957 Okla.) 311 P. 2d 215, Vorvilas v.
V orvilas ( 1948) 252 Wis. 333, 31 NvV 2nd 586 and l'rf ader
c. Nlader ( 1950) 258 Vilis. 117, 44 NW 2nd 924.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

Argument under prior points, which will not be repeated here, establishes the error in the lower court not
considering the testilnony of Dr. rrrowbridge which re- ·
futed the main basis of plaintiff's case. It is evident,
however, that his decision was not based on Findings
of Fact No. 10 and he•, therefore, would have ruled as
he did even if defendant had satisfied the court on a
new trial that no such admission was made. If the other
evidence does not conclusively prove that defendant was
pregnant on December 24, 1956, and if the alleged admission could establish such proof, even when contradicted
by this doctor, appellant respectfully submits that the
testimony of Dr. Trowbridge on this point should be
received in new trial.

SUMMAHY
The evidence did not conclusively establish that the
child born August 13, 1957, was not the child of the plaintiff. The evidence did conclusively prove that the parties
13
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hereto had sexual intercourse at a time when by the lmrs
of nature the plaintiff might be the father of the child
in question. It must be conclusively presumed, therefore,
that plaintiff is the father of this child. The annulment
decree of the lower court should be vacated, the cause remanded to the District Court of Salt Lake County to ascertain what alimony, support money, and counsel fee3,
if any, plaintiff should pray and a decree of divorce
granted to defendant accordingly.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT H. HAXSEX
Attorney for Appellant

Salt Lake City, Utah
65 East 4th South
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